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PLEADINGS: EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION AND THE STATE 
SECRETS DOCTRINE UNDER THE REYNOLDS FRAMEWORK IN 
MOHAMED V. JEPPESEN 
Sarah Topy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1807 case of United States v. Burr, President Thomas Jefferson 
accused former Vice President Aaron Burr of committing treason 
against the United States.1  Burr was allegedly assembling an army to 
try to overtake the South, and was collaborating with foreign nations to 
overthrow the U.S. government.2  In preparation for trial, Burr‘s 
attorneys requested private correspondence from President Jefferson, 
which they claimed was material to their defense.  The Supreme Court, 
in a decision by Chief Justice Marshall, expressed its opinion on 
whether the President could withhold the evidence, stating, ―The 
president, although subject to the general rules which apply to others, 
may have sufficient motives for declining to produce a particular paper, 
and those motives may be such as to restrain the court from enforcing its 
production.‖3  The case signaled the beginning of a common law 
doctrine known as the state secrets privilege, a tool that allows the 
federal government the ability to prevent disclosure of sensitive 
information. 
Since its inception in 1807, the state secrets doctrine has been 
invoked on numerous occasions, particularly in times of war and on 
issues pertaining to national security.4  Over the years, two different 
standards for applying the state secrets doctrine have emerged—one, as 
a total bar to any litigation based solely on the subject matter, and the 
other, an evidentiary privilege to prohibit select secret materials from 
disclosure. 
 
  Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to thank her family for their support, as well as Professor Michael Solimine, Amanda Szuch, and James 
Patrick. 
 1. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692D). 
 2. Id. at 31. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010) (―Courts must 
act in the interest of the country‘s national security to prevent disclosure of state secrets.‖). 
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Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, the use of the state 
secrets doctrine has greatly expanded, especially in cases involving 
extraordinary rendition—where terror suspects are abducted and 
forcibly transported beyond the protection of western laws.  Several of 
these suspects subsequently brought suit in the U.S. alleging abuse 
during their detention.  In all of these cases, the federal government has 
attempted to use the state secrets doctrine to dismiss the cases at the 
outset of the pleading phase. 
This Casenote starts with an examination of the background and 
scope of the state secrets doctrine, particularly with regard to 
extraordinary rendition.  Part III examines the Ninth Circuit‘s recent 
decision in Mohamed v. Jeppesen and how that court applied the 
doctrine.  Part IV discusses how the standard was misused in Mohamed 
and why the suit should have been allowed to continue.  Part IV further 
discusses whether extraordinary rendition is a program that can even 
qualify as a true state secret.  Finally, Part V concludes that, based on 
the current understanding of the state secrets doctrine under the 
Reynolds framework, the Ninth Circuit erred by allowing dismissal on 
the pleadings. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE AND 
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 
A. The State Secrets Doctrine 
Courts have acknowledged that rarely, and only when absolutely 
necessary, they must act in the interest of national security to prevent the 
disclosure of state secrets.5  That means that valid evidence may be 
excluded and litigants may even be denied their day in court.6  There are 
two ways that courts may apply this principle—(1) under the Totten bar 
or (2) under the Reynolds framework.  The Totten bar completely bans 
adjudication of any kind and does not consider the ramifications of a 
dismissal.  Cases are simply thrown out at the outset based on subject 
matter.  Conversely, the Reynolds framework is an evidentiary device 
 
 5. Id. at 1077. 
 6. Id. 
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that excludes certain privileged information.  The exclusion of this 
evidence may eventually prove fatal to the entire suit, but it does not 
immediately preclude the case from being adjudicated.  Each of the 
standards is described below. 
1. The Totten Bar 
The Supreme Court has stated as a general principle that ―public 
policy forbids the maintenance of any suit . . . which would inevitably 
lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as 
confidential.‖7  In the 1876 case of Totten v. U.S., a former spy during 
the Civil War brought suit against the federal government for failing to 
compensate him for his services.8  Concluding that the very existence of 
such a relationship was ―the kind of fact itself not to be disclosed,‖ the 
Court dismissed the suit at the outset and allowed no further 
proceedings.9 
The Totten bar was recently affirmed in Tenet v. U.S., a Supreme 
Court case involving Cold War spies who accused the CIA of reneging 
on a contract to pay for their espionage services.10  Reiterating that the 
Totten bar is ―designed not merely to defeat asserted claims, but to 
preclude judicial inquiry entirely,‖ the Court dismissed the case at the 
outset.11 
Whether or not the Supreme Court has ever used the Totten bar in any 
other case is a matter of some debate.  In its decision in Mohamed v. 
Jeppesen, the Ninth Circuit claimed that the Supreme Court invoked the 
Totten bar in Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education 
Project.12  There, a group of environmentalists sued the United States 
Navy for failing to comply with a requirement to produce environmental 
impact reports.13  While the Ninth Circuit in Mohamed cited that the 
Supreme Court used language from Totten in its dismissal, the Court 
 
 7. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876). 
 8. Id. at 105. 
 9. Id. at 107. 
 10. Tenet v. United States, 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 11. Id. at 6. 
 12. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
 13. Id. at 141. 
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only referenced Totten in dicta, and dismissed the case on other 
grounds.14 
While the Supreme Court has never articulated an actual rule for 
when the Totten bar is appropriate, it has only definitively invoked it in 
espionage cases.15  As a district court recently noted in Hepting v. AT&T 
Corporation, a consequence of spies entering into contracts with the 
United States is an implicit waiver of their rights to litigate because they 
knew that the government could never publicly avow the relationship.16  
Further, while the scope of the Totten bar is unclear, what is clear is 
that it is rarely invoked.  And because of the harsh consequences 
associated with it, courts are dissuaded from using Totten and are 
instead encouraged to evaluate state secret claims under the more 
nuanced Reynolds framework.17  Particularly because the state secrets 
doctrine is entirely judge-made common law, courts are generally 
reluctant to end suits at the outset without trying to parse out privileged 
information from non-privileged information.  The Reynolds framework 
is the favored test with which to conduct a state secrets analysis. 
2. The Reynolds Evidentiary Framework 
Unlike the Totten bar, which completely ends the litigation, the 
Reynolds framework is the more common and less severe application of 
the state secrets doctrine.18  In U.S. v. Reynolds, spouses of civilians 
killed in an Air Force plane crash sued under the Federal Torts Claims 
Act.  The Court held that while some evidence may be excluded under 
the state secrets doctrine, the case as a whole would proceeded without 
the offending evidence.19  In Reynolds, the United States attempted to 
 
 14. Id. at 142 (finding that the Navy was not required to prepare these reports because Congress 
excluded them under the Freedom of Information Act, and the reports in this case were hypothetical and 
not based on actual environmental impact; therefore, the Court‘s holding did not involve the state secrets 
privilege). 
 15. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
the Totten bar has never been clearly defined). 
 16. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 17. See, e.g., Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1084 (noting the harsh consequences of Totten and the rarity 
with which it should be applied). 
 18. Id. 
 19. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). 
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utilize the state secrets doctrine to end the litigation at the outset.  The 
government claimed that the sensitive documents requested by plaintiffs 
were privileged, and therefore, the government was protected from 
disclosure.20  The suit was permitted to proceed because although the 
documents were secret and could be withheld, they had little bearing on 
the merits of the claim.  The Court created a new framework for 
evaluating state secrets that considered the specific evidence rather than 
the nature of the case itself.21 
In subsequent decisions since Reynolds, courts have developed a 
three-part test for the proper invocation of state secrets under this 
framework.22  First, the defendant must satisfy certain procedural 
requirements.23  Second, courts must determine if the information is 
indeed privileged.24  Finally, and only if the claim of privilege is 
successful, courts must decide how to proceed in light of that claim.25 
For the procedural requirements to be satisfied, a director of a 
governmental agency—and not a subordinate—must invoke the doctrine 
and personally explain why the information must be kept secret.26  The 
privilege is limited to government officials and is not available to 
private parties.27  If the procedural requirements are satisfied, the court 
will examine the information to determine if the information is truly a 
secret.28  If the court determines that it is, then it has to determine how to 
proceed while making every attempt to separate out the privileged 
information from the non-privileged information so that the suit can 
proceed. 
If the plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case without the privileged 
 
 20. Id. at 4. 
 21. Id. (holding that the Air Force‘s plans and blueprints had no bearing on whether faulty 
engineering and mechanics contributed to the crash). 
 22. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1080–83 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations 
omitted) (outlining the three-part test). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1080. 
 27. Id.  In cases where the government intervenes and then moves for dismissal, the government 
official can assert the privilege on behalf of itself and other defendants. 
 28. In camera investigations allow for the courts to review sensitive information that the public 
cannot access before determining its admissibility in open court.  
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evidence, then the suit is dismissed.29  Similarly, if the defendant is 
denied an opportunity to present a valid defense because doing so would 
invoke the privileged information, the suit is also dismissed.30 
Some courts have added a third consideration, holding that if the 
privileged information is so closely related to the non-privileged, a suit 
can be dismissed because of the unacceptable risk of disclosure of state 
secrets.31  The court can dismiss the suit if the potential for disclosure is 
too significant, even when the plaintiff and defendant are able to 
establish their initial arguments using non-privileged information.32 
Unlike the Totten bar, which dismisses the suit without considering 
the other parties‘ interests, the Reynolds framework is a balancing test.  
Under Reynolds, courts examine the government‘s claim of privilege 
critically, without mere acceptance, while still offering great deference 
to the government‘s claim of national security.33  Because Reynolds‘s 
flexibility often allows the case to proceed after certain evidence or 
particular claims are removed, it is the standard that courts most often 
invoke as it does not deny litigants their day in court.  From a public 
policy standpoint, courts have noted the state secrets doctrine is a judge-
made common law doctrine, and less harsh consequences to litigants is a 
more favored approach. 
B. The State Secrets Doctrine in Post 9/11 Cases 
The federal government has asserted the state secrets doctrine in a 
series of recent cases following the attacks on September 11.  Since the 
attacks, the government has become more aggressive in the war on 
terror.  In response to this aggressive approach, plaintiffs have brought 
suits alleging various violations, which the government has attempted to 
quash by citing the state secrets privilege.  In two recent cases, plaintiffs 
alleged that the government secretly recorded private conversations in 
violation of wiretapping statutes. 
 
 29. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1080–83 (9th Cir. 2010) 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1083 (holding that proceeding with a case would be ―an unacceptable risk of disclosing 
state secrets‖). 
 33. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953). 
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In In re Sealed Case, a former Drug Enforcement Agency official 
accused his bosses of secretly wiretapping his conversations to build 
evidence against him in order to fire him.34  Citing the national security 
interests surrounding the case and the need to protect the identities of 
CIA operatives, the government moved for dismissal under the state 
secrets doctrine.35  The district court initially granted the dismissal, but 
the appeals court for the District of Columbia reversed.  The appellate 
court found that although there was some privileged information, the 
plaintiff could establish a prima facie case using non-privileged 
information, as stipulated by the Reynolds framework.36  One reason the 
court refused to dismiss the suit was because the CIA provided no 
concrete answer as to why the case could not proceed.  The court 
refused to rely on a merely hypothetical defense.37  The court went on to 
hold, ―Where the United States has sufficient grounds to invoke the state 
secrets privilege, allowing the mere prospect of a privileged defense to 
thwart a citizen‘s efforts to vindicate his constitutional rights would run 
afoul of the Supreme Court‘s caution [in these cases].‖38 
More recently, in Hepting, the plaintiffs initiated a class action suit 
and sued the government and AT&T alleging that AT&T was providing 
structural support for the government‘s illegal wiretapping program.39  
Employees at AT&T testified that the company had worked with the 
government to build a supercomputer for the purpose of spying on 
private conversations on the phone and the Internet.40  The government, 
representing itself and AT&T, moved to dismiss the entire suit under 
either Totten or Reynolds.41  In denying that request, the court held that 
because President Bush and other government officials had publicly 
acknowledged the wiretapping program and confirmed AT&T‘s role in 
the program, the government had opened the door for precisely the type 
 
 34. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 151. 
 37. Id. at 149–150. 
 38. Id. at 151. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 41. Id. 
7
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of suit that plaintiffs brought.42 
Both In re Sealed Case and Hepting acknowledged that when the 
subject matter is not itself a state secret, dismissal on the pleadings is 
often inappropriate. 
1. El-Masri v. U.S.: The First Extraordinary Rendition Case 
Some of the most recent cases concerning the government‘s claim of 
the state secrets doctrine deal with its program of extraordinary 
rendition—a program designed to interrogate alleged terror suspects in 
countries that do not abide by U.S. or international law.43  Extraordinary 
rendition allows for the transfer of these suspects to locales where there 
are far fewer restrictions on the types of interrogation methods that can 
be used to extract information from them, which can then be used in the 
war on terror.44 
The first extraordinary rendition case tried in American courts was 
the Fourth Circuit‘s 2007 decision in El-Masri v. United States.45  In this 
case, El-Masri, a German citizen, accused former CIA Director George 
Tenet, various CIA officers, and several private companies of 
committing tortuous acts under the Alien Tort Statute after they 
allegedly arranged for El-Masri‘s kidnapping and detention in 
Macedonia.46  El-Masri claimed that he was secretly flown to that 
country, interrogated, beaten, blindfolded, and prohibited from 
communicating with others.  Upon El-Masri‘s release—allegedly 
granted because U.S. operatives admitted to ―having the wrong man‖—
he brought suit against both private and public officials.47  El-Masri 
advanced two arguments that were ultimately rejected: (1) that 
extraordinary rendition is not a state secret and (2) that even if the state 
secrets doctrine applied, the court should not dismiss the entire suit at 
the outset before discovery could even occur.  El-Masri argued that it 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining the 
extraordinary rendition program). 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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was possible to separate out privileged information from non-privileged 
information.48 
The Fourth Circuit rejected El-Masri‘s arguments, despite 
acknowledging that the press had revealed some details on the 
extraordinary rendition program and despite a report issued by the 
British government detailing the U.S. involvement in the program.49  
The court upheld the dismissal even before responsive pleadings from 
the defendants were filed and before any discovery was permitted.50 
In ruling that the district court was correct in granting the 
government‘s motion to dismiss at the outset, the Fourth Circuit 
examined the case.  The court concluded that the very subject matter of 
the suit and the central facts needed to litigate it were so closely 
connected to the offending state secrets that dismissal was proper.51  The 
court continued, stating, ―Dismissal at the pleading stage is appropriate 
if state secrets are so central to a proceeding that it cannot be litigated 
without threatening their disclosure.‖52  Said another way, the Fourth 
Circuit required more than the plaintiff‘s ability to make a prima facie 
case with non-privileged evidence; the court required the plaintiff to 
establish that litigation could proceed, beyond a prima facie case, 
without the use of privileged evidence.  Because the court determined 
that such a case could not be made without the offending evidence, 
dismissal was appropriate even at the pleading stage.53 
Further, the court stated that though public information had been 
revealed through the media about the extraordinary rendition program, 
that alone was insufficient to no longer classify extraordinary rendition 
as a state secret.54  When El-Masri argued that he could make his claims 
with only publicly circulated information, the court again rejected his 
arguments claiming that even if El-Masri could establish his case, the 
 
 48. Id. at 302. 
 49. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 310 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 50. Id. at 313. 
 51. Id. at 308. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 308–309 (asserting that though the press was aware of El-Masri‘s ordeal, ―[A]dvancing 
a case in the court of public opinion, against the United States at large, is an undertaking quite different 
from prevailing against specific defendants in a court of law.‖). 
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defendants would require the privileged information as part of any valid 
defense they would raise.55 
For two years, El-Masri was the only extraordinary rendition case on 
file until plaintiffs alleging they were tortured recently brought suit in 
the Ninth Circuit. 
III. MOHAMED V. JEPPESEN 
In Mohamed v Jeppesen, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the most recent 
case of extraordinary rendition.  In a 6–5 decision, the court chose to 
grant the U.S. government‘s motion to dismiss at the pleading stage 
based on the state secrets doctrine.56 
In Mohamed, five foreign-born men sued in federal court claiming 
that they were victims of the extraordinary rendition program.57  While 
the plaintiffs were from different countries and were transferred to 
different locations, each recounted a similar story of being arrested, 
transferred to American custody, forcibly transferred to another country, 
and tortured in various ways.58  The plaintiffs alleged that they were 
beaten, subjected to shock therapy, held without the ability to contact 
their families or legal counsel, and forced to endure inhumane living 
conditions.  The detainees also alleged that they were bound and 
gagged, and were kept in almost total darkness.59  In all cases, they were 
eventually released and returned to their home countries.60 
Instead of suing the government, as the plaintiffs had in El-Masri, the 
plaintiffs in Mohamed sued Jeppesen Dataplan Incorporated (Jeppesen) 
under the Alien Tort Act, alleging forced disappearance, torture, and 
various First Amendment violations.61  A subsidiary of Boeing 
Corporation, Jeppesen is a transportation and airline company that, 
according to the plaintiffs, arranged the flights that sent the alleged 
 
 55. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308–309 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 56. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1074–1075. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1075. 
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victims to the countries where they were allegedly tortured.62  The 
plaintiffs argued that Jeppesen knew or should have known its actions 
were facilitating torture, and that it intentionally falsified flight plans to 
avoid public scrutiny.63  After the suit had been brought in district court, 
the U.S. government intervened, and argued that the case should be 
dismissed, relying on the state secrets privilege.64  The government 
reasoned that any case on extraordinary rendition would involve 
national security details that could not be exposed.  After allowing the 
government‘s intervention, the district court granted the motion to 
dismiss under the state secrets doctrine, but it did so under the Totten 
bar.  The government argued that the very subject matter was forbidden 
from suit, rather than arguing the Reynolds evidentiary framework, 
which would have allowed the case to proceed.65 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel reversed the 
district court‘s decision, holding that the government had failed to 
establish a basis for dismissal under the state secrets doctrine.66  
However, the Ninth Circuit decided to review the case en banc and 
eventually ruled to reinstate the district court‘s motion to dismiss.67 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with a discussion of whether to 
apply the Totten or the Reynolds bar to review the government‘s use of 
the state secrets doctrine.68  The court concluded that while the Totten 
bar may not be as narrow as the plaintiffs would argue, the Reynolds 
framework was the more appropriate in this case.69  After establishing 
that the first two criteria of the Reynolds test were satisfied—(1) the 
government properly invoked the privilege and (2) the information 
presented was a state secret—the court was left with the third prong of 
the Reynolds framework—to evaluate how the case should proceed in 
 
 62. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  Significantly, the government advanced its state secret argument under both the Totten 
and Reynolds frameworks.  Id. 
 65. Id. at 1077; see also Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
 66. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1084. 
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light of the offending state secrets.70 
The first rule of law the court acknowledged was that, wherever 
possible, secret information should be walled off from non-secret 
information, and the suit should proceed without that evidence.71  
However, where the information between secret and non-secret evidence 
is so closely connected that the suit cannot continue for fear of 
revelation, then courts can dismiss the entire case at the outset.72  
Acknowledging that dismissing the entire suit is within the purview of 
Totten and that the Ninth Circuit rejected other decisions conflating the 
two standards, the majority nonetheless concluded that they operate on a 
continuum.  The court held, therefore, that it is possible for the Reynolds 
framework to reach the same practical conclusion as Totten: dismissal 
on the pleadings.73 
The Ninth Circuit pre-empted the dissent‘s argument and stressed in 
its decision that this dismissal may occur as early as the pleadings, even 
before an answer is offered or before discovery begins.74  The court 
concluded that because there was an unjustifiable risk that state secrets 
may be exposed, there was no reason to be reckless and push things to 
the limit to allow cases to proceed when it is clear that they are 
sufficiently reliant on state secrets.75  Importantly, the Ninth Circuit 
conceded that the government‘s extraordinary rendition program is not a 
pure state secret and that the plaintiffs may well be able to establish a 
prima facie case based on the public records evidence it procured.76  
However, the court found the dismissal at the pleading stage a proper 
decision because the defense may have had to use state secrets in order 
to defend itself, creating a potential for harm from future litigation,.77 
Finally, the court pointed out several other remedies that may offer 
 
 70. Id. at 1086. 
 71. Id. (reiterating that ―[W]henever possible, sensitive information must be disentangled from 
nonsensitive information to allow for the release of the latter.‘‖). 
 72. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2010); see also El-
Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 73. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1089 (agreeing that Reynolds, unlike Totten, does not support 
dismissal based on the subject matter yet ultimately dismissal may still be appropriate). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1083. 
 76. Id. at 1090. 
 77. Id. 
12
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/6
2011] CASENOTE—MUHAMMED V. JEPPESEN 249 
redress, including Congressional action preventing future use of 
extraordinary rendition or the President admitting wrongdoing and 
offering reparations to victims.78 
In a vigorous dissent, five justices argued that, like the Fourth Circuit 
in El-Masri, the majority was conflating the Totten bar and the Reynolds 
framework.79  Reiterating that Reynolds is solely an evidentiary 
privilege and should be used only to suppress offending evidence and 
not to excise entire claims, the dissent argued that the majority 
misapplied Reynolds.80  First, the dissent reasoned that since the court 
was considering a Rule 12 motion for dismissal, the court‘s job was 
merely to assess whether the plaintiff had maintained a cause of action 
for which relief can be granted.  The court‘s job was not, according to 
the dissent, to consider the merits of the litigation or to decide potential 
issues associated with future litigation.81  Next, the dissent explained 
that the defense‘s filing of a Rule 8(b)(6) motion to refuse an answer 
was meant to apply only to specific requests for information and not, as 
the majority argued, meant to prevent the government from filing an 
answer altogether.82  Where a defendant cannot answer part of a 
complaint because of evidentiary rules, the defendant must still address 
the parts of the complaint that are answerable so that the suit can 
proceed.83  If the majority was correct—that the defendants could excise 
entire allegations at the outset—the Reynolds privilege would become 
an immunity doctrine.84  For that reason, the dissent was not convinced 
that there is ever a case where, under Reynolds, the entire suit could be 
dismissed at the pleadings.85 
Finally, the dissent argued that because of the significant 
constitutional claims at stake in this case, the priority that courts place 
on due process, and the importance of checks and balances, the court 
 
 78. Id. at 1091. 
 79. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010) (Hawkins, J., 
dissenting). 
 80. Id. at 1093–1094. 
 81. Id. at 1100. 
 82. Id. at 1098. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1099 n.12 (9th Cir. 2010) (Hawkins, J., 
dissenting). 
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should grant litigants their day in court and not dismiss entire suits.86  
The dissent, like the majority, readily agreed that certain aspects of 
Mohamed may concern state secrets and may be prohibited because of 
the state secrets doctrine.  The dissent, however, argued that the case 
should be remanded to the district court for the defendants to file an 
answer to determine if the case could proceed.87 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. The Ninth Circuit Conflated the Totten and Reynolds Standards and 
Failed to Recognize That Extraordinary Rendition’s “Very Subject 
Matter” Is Not a State Secret. 
The Ninth Circuit‘s first error in dismissing Mohamed at the pleading 
phase was, ironically, something that the court had previously criticized 
about the Fourth Circuit‘s decision in El-Masri.  Specifically, the Ninth 
Circuit erred by conflating the Totten total bar on litigation standard 
with the more nuanced Reynolds evidentiary framework.88 
The U.S. Supreme Court was clear in Totten that dismissal of an 
entire suit at the outset should occur only when the very subject matter 
of the case is itself a state secret.89  If the subject matter is not a state 
secret, then courts are to use the Reynolds framework, which merely 
prohibits the introduction of privileged evidence.90  If the plaintiff 
cannot establish a prima facie case or the defense is denied critical 
evidence without the offending information, then dismissal of the suit 
may be appropriate.91  But Reynolds, by its own assertion, is an 
evidentiary test and is not an immunity doctrine.92 
As the Ninth Circuit conceded in Mohamed, the extraordinary 
 
 86. Id. at 1101. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1087 n.12 (explaining how the court conceded it had objected to El-Masri in a previous 
decision because of its overbroad interpretation of the ―very subject matter‖ analysis). 
 89. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). 
 90. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 91. See id. at 1083. 
 92. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953). 
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rendition program is not a state secret.93  However, the court reasoned 
that even under Reynolds, the government could prevail on its state 
secret argument to dismiss at the pleadings.94  By explaining that even 
though some aspects of the program were known, there was too great a 
risk of disclosure of those secret elements if the suit proceeded to 
litigation, the Ninth Circuit applied the Totten bar to a Reynolds 
question. 
This application is inappropriate for several reasons, and was 
disavowed by the Ninth Circuit itself just two years before it decided 
Mohamed.95  
1. Extraordinary Rendition Is Not a State Secret and Sufficient 
Information About the Program Already Existed in the Public Realm to 
Allow the Suit to Commence. 
First, while it may be true in other contexts that the potential 
disclosure of state secrets is too great to allow a suit to commence 
because of the state secrets doctrine, the breadth and depth of coverage 
on the extraordinary rendition program is so significant that it is difficult 
to see why dismissal on the pleadings was necessary here.96  The 
extraordinary rendition program has been publicly acknowledged by the 
President of the United States, high-ranking members of the U.S. 
government, the governments of other nations, and countless media and 
news organizations.97 
The New Yorker magazine first exposed the extraordinary rendition 
program in a scathing 2006 article, in which a British journalist exposed 
 
 93. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1090 ―[The court] do[es] not hold that the existence of the 
extraordinary rendition program is itself a state secret.‖). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering a 
state secrets case just two years prior to Mohamed and disagreeing with too expansive a reading of the 
state secrets privilege that allowed for outright dismissal at the pleadings). 
 96. As this Casenote observes, the dissent in Mohamed prepared a 1,800 page appendix of public 
records and documents that highlights the information already available concerning extraordinary 
rendition. 
 97. Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have acknowledged U.S. participation 
in the program, as have other top officials in U.S. government, including current Attorney General Eric 
Holder who supplied the memo invoking the state secret privilege in Mohamed. 
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alleged torture practices detailed in top-secret documents obtained from 
the Spanish government, which described the rendition flights.98  That 
journalist, Stephen Gray, wrote a book called ―Ghost Plane,‖ which 
detailed El-Masri‘s allegations.  Gray‘s book also included information 
alleging that then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice ordered El-
Masri‘s release when the government discovered that they had 
imprisoned the wrong man.99 
Following the Fourth Circuit‘s ruling in El-Masri and concerns from 
civil rights organizations that the U.S. was sanctioning torture, Congress 
initiated two years of hearings on the extraordinary rendition 
program.100  In April 2007, two House foreign affairs committees held a 
joint hearing on the legality of extraordinary rendition.  The hearing 
featured heated exchanges among Congressmen opposed to the practice, 
members of the CIA, and other intelligence experts who vehemently—
and in great detail—defended the program‘s merits.101  After learning 
more about extraordinary rendition, Congressman Bill Delhaunt 
remarked, ―These renditions not only appear to violate our obligations 
under the UN Convention Against Torture and other international 
treaties, but they have undermined our very commitment to fundamental 
American values.‖102  That same year, Senator Joe Biden of Delaware 
introduced legislation to prohibit rendition.103 
During the 2009 opening arguments in front of the Ninth Circuit, 
Mohamed‘s attorneys argued that there were no state secrets left to 
protect.  In support, Mohamed‘s attorneys cited to the fact that the 
government had declassified thousands of pages of information about 
interrogation techniques.  Mohamed‘s attorneys also explained that all 
other nations involved in extraordinary rendition had acknowledged 
 
 98. Jane Mayer, The CIA’s Travel Agent, NEW YORKER (Oct. 30, 2006), 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/30/061030ta_talk_mayer (citing El-Masri‘s case and 
including an interview with Jeppesen about its involvement in the extraordinary rendition program). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Couterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic 
Relations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Bill Delahunt). 
 103. In 2007, following these hearings, Senator Biden introduced the National Security with 
Justice Act of 2007.  This act would have significantly curbed the use of extraordinary rendition and 
would have required strict constraints on who is deemed an enemy combatant. 
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their role in it.104  Additionally, in 2010 the New York Times conducted 
an open and on-the-record interview with officials from the Obama 
Administration, who defended extraordinary rendition and explained its 
benefits.105 
In sum, the amount of information—including Congressional 
hearings presented on the public record—that has emerged in just two 
years since the decision in El-Masri changes the dynamics of the 
extraordinary rendition debate.  The amount of information makes it 
clear that extraordinary rendition is not a state secret.  Further, there is 
nothing so inherently secretive about extraordinary rendetion that should 
allow for dismissal of litigation on the pleadings. 
This is the same logic that the D.C. Court of Appeals applied recently 
in its decision in Hepting v. AT&T.106  The court in Hepting conducted a 
long and detailed factual analysis of the government‘s wiretapping 
program, and concluded that the public knowledge of the program was 
so pervasive that its very subject matter could no longer be considered a 
state secret.107 
As evidence that the subject matter in Hepting was not a state secret, 
the court drew on similar information that the dissent in Mohamed 
highlighted: the fact that the President of the United States had 
acknowledged the program, that major media outlets had reported on the 
program, that high-level government officials had commented on the 
program, and that Congress had investigated the merits of the 
program.108 
With all of that information, the court determined that the subject 
matter of the case did not require dismissal on the pleadings and elected 
to return the issue to the district court to determine if the plaintiff could 
 
 104. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 105. John B. Bellinger III, Op-Ed., More Continuity Than Change, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/opinion/15iht-edbellinger.html. 
 106. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 107. Id. at 986.  Specifically, the court cites two reports—a New York Times article and a radio 
address by former President George W. Bush—that exposed sufficient details about the wiretapping 
program so that it was no longer a state secret.  Id.  The court determined that because the government 
had already admitted to the basic ―contours‖ of the wiretapping program, exclusion of states secrets was 
unnecessary.  Id.  This argument is clearly applicable to the extraordinary rendition program as 
described in Mohamed. 
 108. Id. 
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establish a prima facie case against the government.109 
Perhaps most significantly, the Hepting court distinguished the 
subject matter of illegal wiretapping with the extraordinary rendition 
program that had recently been found to be a state secret by the Fourth 
Circuit in El-Masri.110  The Hepting court looked to El-Masri and 
concluded that the court was correct in dismissing El-Masri at the 
outset, based on the pleadings, because there was only ―limited sketches 
of the alleged program [that] had been disclosed.‖  Additionally, the 
issue in El-Masri concerned the existence of extraordinary rendition and 
whether the government was involved in it.111  However, as outlined 
above, because of the years that elapsed between the Fourth Circuit‘s 
decision in El-Masri and the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Mohamed, 
sufficient information about the extraordinary rendition program has 
come to light to negate many of the concerns over the secretive nature of 
the program.  Indeed, there is no question anymore as to whether the 
government is involved in the program, only whether the government 
was illegally torturing people. 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit would have been correct to apply the 
same test that the D.C. Court of Appeals did in Hepting—determining 
that because the subject matter was not a state secret, dismissal at the 
outset was inappropriate, and remanding to the district court as the trier 
of fact to discern whether the case could proceed. 
2. As the Ninth Circuit Noted, If the Subject Matter Is Not a State 
Secret, Then Allowing Dismissal on the Pleadings Misapplies the 
Reynolds Test 
Two years prior to Mohamed, the Ninth Circuit in Al-Haramain v. 
U.S. clearly held that the state secrets doctrine under the Reynolds 
analysis should not allow dismissal on the pleadings.112 
After learning that its phones had been illegally wiretapped, Al-
Haramain, a charitable organization, sued the government for violating 
its Fourth Amendment rights.  The Ninth Circuit distinguished the case 
 
 109. Id. at 994. 
 110. Id. at 984–985. 
 111. Id. at 994. 
 112. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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from the Fourth Circuit‘s decision in El-Masri by allowing the claims to 
proceed even though certain evidence had to be excluded from the case.  
Whereas the Fourth Circuit concluded that ―for purposes of the state 
secrets analysis, the ‗central facts‘ and ‗very subject matter‘ of an action 
are those facts that are essential to prosecuting the action or defending 
against it,‘‖ the Ninth Circuit did not necessarily view those two 
concepts as one and the same.  Said differently, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected the Fourth Circuit‘s holding that the ―very subject matter‖ test 
was dispositive as to whether the plaintiff could establish a prima facie 
case.113  The Ninth Circuit distinguished its decision from cases that 
must be dismissed at the very outset because of their subject matter and 
cases in which the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case absent the 
challenged material.114  Dismissal at the outset, the court reasoned, was 
an overbroad reading of the state secrets doctrine when (1) the plaintiff 
is able to present a case using admissible facts and (2) the subject matter 
is not banned under Totten.  Based on this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit 
misapplied the Reynolds test to Mohamed and allowed the case to be 
dismissed prematurely. 
B. The Reynolds Framework Is an Evidentiary Privilege and Should 
Prevent Dismissal of an Entire Suit When the Plaintiff Can Establish a 
Prima Facie Case and the Defendant Has not Even Submitted an 
Answer. 
Having established that extraordinary rendition in general is not, by 
its very subject matter, a state secret, it is clear that the Totten bar to 
litigation was the incorrect standard to utilize in Mohamed.  The Ninth 
Circuit‘s error was not in applying Reynolds, but in conflating the two 
standards and allowing an evidentiary privilege to dismiss an entire suit 
at the pleadings before the defendant even filed an answer. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court articulated in Reynolds, the test over 
whether to allow the admittance of evidence is if ―there is a reasonable 
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters 
 
 113. Id. at 1201–1202 (distinguishing El-Masri from Al-Haramain). 
 114. Id. 
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which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.‖115  If, 
after the evidentiary privilege is properly asserted and the offending 
information is excised, the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, 
then dismissal at the pleadings may be appropriate.  However, if that is 
not the situation, then the Reynolds test, like all other rules of evidence, 
is merely a tool for courts to discern how a case should proceed.  The 
general rule under the Reynolds framework is that, where possible, 
privileged information should be separated out from non-privileged 
information and the case should proceed.116  Because this is the goal of 
the Reynolds framework, and because granting due process to litigants is 
such a fundamental right, courts should afford plaintiffs every 
opportunity to overcome evidentiary hurdles. 
The dissent in Mohamed correctly observed that even if the state 
secrets privilege can be asserted as early as the pleadings stage, the 
privilege allows defendants to utilize only Rule 8(b)(6) motions to 
restrict their answers.  Importantly, the dissent noted that nothing in the 
Reynolds test, or the rules of evidence generally, allows an evidentiary 
privilege to expand into an immunity doctrine.  As the Supreme Court 
observed in Reynolds, the state secrets privilege ―has long been 
established in the law of evidence‖ and is meant to be applied as other 
evidentiary precautions are, and no broader than that. 
The plaintiff in Mohamed acknowledged and stipulated that there may 
be certain pieces of evidence that would be prohibited from admittance 
based on the state secrets privilege.  But that evidence should be 
considered on a piece-by-piece basis, and at the very least, the defendant 
should have to file an answer and disclose which evidence the defendant 
would be unable to produce.117 
However, the majority in Mohamed rejected both the dissent‘s 
argument that an evidentiary privilege is not intended to excise entire 
claims and the plaintiffs‘ plea to wait until further in the litigation to 
determine if the suit could proceed.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
majority relied on two cases that, under the Reynolds framework, 
dismissed entire suits without allowing them to proceed.  However, the 
 
 115. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). 
 116. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1086 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 117. Id. at 1072. 
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similarities between Mohamed and those two cases are tenuous at best, 
making the two cases not readily applicable. 
The first case that the majority cited was its own precedent, Kasza v. 
Browner.  In that decision, plaintiffs were former workers at an Air 
Force base who sued the Air Force and the United States government for 
violating certain health and safety standards.118  Because the defendants 
asserted the state secrets privilege at the pleadings and, when fully 
examined, ―the mosaic of privileged and non-privileged information 
together‖ was sufficient for the dismissal of the litigation, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that Mohamed followed Kasza, and should allow for 
outright dismissal.119 
However, there are two important distinctions between Mohamed and 
Kasza, which the majority failed to consider.  First, Kasza permitted the 
case to proceed and required the government to file a response before 
rendering its decision.120  It was not until later, after discovery 
commenced and the court considered each piece of evidence separately, 
that the Ninth Circuit concluded that much of the information the 
plaintiffs requested would be barred by the evidentiary privilege of the 
state secrets doctrine.  In Mohamed, the plaintiff argued that the timing 
of the dismissal in his case was inappropriate and that he could establish 
his case without asking for offending evidence in discovery.  That 
Mohamed never received that opportunity while the plaintiffs in Kasza 
did is a major difference between the two cases. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning for dismissing Kasza differed 
greatly from its reasoning for dismissing Mohamed.  After the excluded 
evidence was prohibited in Kasza, there was no information left for the 
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case.  Additionally, the court later 
determined that the very subject matter in Kasza was a state secret, 
which precluded further judicial inquiry entirely.  These two factors—
(1) that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case without the 
offending evidence and (2) that the very subject matter was a state 
secret—are absent in Mohamed.  In Mohamed, the court assumed, 
arguendo, that plaintiff could establish a prima facie case.  The court 
 
 118. Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 119. Id. at 1170. 
 120. Id. at 1164. 
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also acknowledged the thousands of public records that the plaintiff had 
procured to mount a complaint.  Additionally, the court clearly stated 
that extraordinary rendition as a subject matter is simply not a state 
secret. 
The Ninth Circuit next considered Black v. U.S. as proof that 
dismissal on the pleadings is appropriate under the Reynolds evidentiary 
privilege.121  In Black, the plaintiff, an electrical engineer who worked 
for the government and the CIA, brought federal tort and Bivens actions 
against the government for psychological and physical damage he 
allegedly received after they learned of an encounter he had with a 
Soviet.122  Similar to Kasza, the Eighth Circuit allowed the suit to 
proceed until discovery.  During discovery, the court determined that the 
suit must be dismissed due to the plaintiff‘s failure to prove a prima 
facie case without the offending evidence.  As stated above, Mohamed is 
distinguishable from Black in that the plaintiff in Mohamed met his 
prima facie burden and the defendants were at least required to submit 
an answer.  Therefore, because both Kasza and Black present such stark 
and significant differences from the conclusions reached in Mohamed, 
the cases were inapplicable in Mohamed. 
In considering how the Reynolds evidentiary framework should be 
utilized in cases concerning state secret privileges, the Ninth Circuit 
should have considered the following two cases from the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
The first case, Ellsberg v. Mitchell, involved plaintiffs alleging that 
they were victims of warrantless wiretapping authorized by the 
government and the CIA.123  The plaintiffs in Ellsberg, who were 
defendants in a related criminal case, filed interrogatories and requested 
discovery from various governmental organizations about the extent and 
scope of the wiretapping.124  When the government asserted the state 
 
 121. Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir.1995). 
 122. Bivens actions allow for damage remedies for constitutional violations committed by federal 
agents. 
 123. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  The plaintiffs in were defendants in the 
famous ―Pentagon papers‖ case, where Daniel Ellsberg and other defendants were accused of illegally 
releasing confidential information about the Vietnam War to the media and other public organizations.  
Id. at 52. 
 124. Id. 
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secrets privilege exempted it from disclosing the information, the district 
court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss.125  However, in an 
important and oft-cited opinion on the state secrets doctrine, the D.C. 
Court of Appeals reversed the decision.  According to the appellate 
court, if the Totten test was inapplicable, the Reynolds evidentiary 
privilege was insufficient to permit excising entire claims.  Therefore, 
the court ruled that dismissing the entire suit was not appropriate.126  
The court of appeals further explained that, under Reynolds, privileged 
information is merely to be treated ―as though a witness had died, and 
the case will proceed with no consequences save those resulting from 
the loss of the evidence.‖127  The state secrets privilege, the court 
concluded, does not allow for the outright dismissal of the suit without 
consideration of the evidence—a rule that the D.C. court affirmed only 
recently.128 
In a 2005 case, Crater Corp. v. Lucent, Crater sued Lucent 
Technologies for breaching patent permissions when Lucent unveiled a 
―coupling device‖ that Crater alleged it had already developed.129  The 
U.S. government reportedly utilized this technology for its illegal 
wiretapping program.  When Crater brought suit, the government 
intervened, asserting the state secrets privilege at the pleadings to 
prevent disclosures about this device from surfacing.130  The D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court‘s grant of the 
government‘s motion to dismiss, holding that the motion was not ripe 
for consideration until discovery could be conducted.131  The court of 
appeals described the district court‘s action as ―putting the cart before 
the horse,‖ and despite acknowledging that some evidence would clearly 
be protected by the state secrets doctrine, the appellate court remanded 
the case for a much more thorough examination of the evidence.132 
 
 125. Id. at 64. 
 126. Id. at 62. 
 127. Id. at 64. 
 128. See Crater Corp. v. Lucent, 423 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 129. Id. at 1263. 
 130. Id. (noting that the U.S. objected to any discovery that would reveal the development or 
usage of the coupling device). 
 131. Id. at 1268. 
 132. Id. (concluding that further proceedings were required to determine if sufficient non-
privileged evidence existed to allow the suit to continue.) 
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Ellsberg and Crater, therefore, stand for the proposition that even 
when the state secrets doctrine is properly invoked, the evidence must be 
examined piece by piece to determine how the case should proceed.  
Treating offending evidence like a witness who has died, and preventing 
courts from prematurely dismissing suits involving state secrets, is, 
according to these decisions, precisely what Reynolds hoped to achieve. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is clear that (1) the Reynolds test is an 
evidentiary privilege, and evidentiary privileges are not immunity 
doctrines; (2) whenever possible, courts should attempt to separate out 
privileged information from non-privileged information so that the case 
can proceed; (3) the Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied Kasza and Black 
to its analysis; and (4) two significant state secrets cases not considered 
by the Ninth Circuit more aptly compare to Mohamed.  While the 
plaintiff in Mohamed conceded that some information in his case may 
be privileged, the Ninth Circuit erred in its understanding of the 
Reynolds evidentiary test.  This misunderstanding led to dismissal of the 
entire suit at the pleadings before a detailed analysis of the evidence 
could occur. 
C. The Ninth Circuit Incorrectly Allowed the Assertion of a Hypothetical 
Defense Instead of Requiring Jeppesen to Assert a Valid Defense. 
Courts agree that when analyzing a state secrets doctrine issue, it is 
not enough to consider the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff can 
establish a prima facie case; courts must also consider whether 
defendants can assert a valid defense.133  If defendants cannot assert a 
valid defense without the secret evidence, courts may properly dismiss 
entire suits at the pleadings.134  A ―valid defense‖ must be legally 
sufficient and meritorious.135  For this reason, the Ninth Circuit erred by 
granting the defendant‘s motion to dismiss not based on any valid 
defense but on the proposition of a valid defense, which was never 
actually asserted. 
Before the Ninth Circuit decided Mohamed en banc, a three-judge 
 
 133. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (defining ―meritorious‖ as meriting a legal victory). 
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panel on the court of appeals ruled to overturn the district court and 
allow the case to proceed.136  That three-judge panel acknowledged that 
the issue of state secrets may surface in the case and may prevent the 
defendants from asserting a valid defense.137  The panel concluded, 
however, that the government‘s arguments were premature, and the 
lower court should not evaluate ―hypothetical claims‖ that had not yet 
been introduced.138 
The government‘s attempt to rely on hypothetical defenses was 
explicitly rejected by the three-judge panel.  Even though this position 
was later overturned en banc, it has support.  It is the law in the D.C. 
Circuit as articulated in In re Sealed Case.  There, a Drug Enforcement 
Agency officer who worked in Burma sued the State Department in a 
Bivens action.  The officer alleged that he was harassed and spied on 
because his superior, an unnamed CIA agent, had a vendetta against 
him.139  The officer further alleged that his phones were illegally 
wiretapped, that conversations he had with his subordinates were taken 
out of context, and that he was repeatedly threatened and intimidated.140  
The State Department and CIA argued that they could not answer 
plaintiff‘s complaint because of the state secrets privilege—an argument 
that the D.C. Court of Appeals emphatically rejected. 
The court of appeals reasoned that while there were possible defenses 
that the government could raise that would involve state secrets, none 
had actually been raised.  As the court went on to conclude: 
Were the valid defense exception expanded to mandate dismissal of a 
complaint for any plausible or colorable defense, then virtually every case 
in which the United States successfully invokes the state secrets privilege 
would need to be dismissed.  This would mean abandoning the practice of 
deciding cases on the basis of evidence-the unprivileged evidence and 
 
 136. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 
586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 960 (dismissing the government‘s argument when it tried to assert hypothetical claims 
that had not yet been considered by the court). 
 139. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  For a description of a Bevins action, 
see supra note 122. 
 140. Id. 
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privileged-but-dispositive evidence-in favor of a system of conjecture.
141
 
Also, when issuing its remand orders to the district court, the D.C. 
Court of Appeals instructed that under the Reynolds framework 
dismissal on the pleadings was appropriate only if (1) the plaintiff could 
not establish a prima facie case without the offending evidence or (2) the 
defendant‘s valid defense is obscured to the point that the trier of fact is 
likely to reach an erroneous conclusion.142  The D.C. court, therefore, 
correctly understood that as an evidentiary privilege, the appropriate role 
of the appeals court in state secret cases is to allow district courts to 
consider the facts and evidence.  This approach, which was advocated 
by the dissent in Mohamed, was not accepted by the Ninth Circuit‘s 
majority, which misapplied the evidentiary privilege by refusing to 
remand for a consideration of whether Jeppesen‘s valid defense was 
barred by state secrets. 
El-Masri is one of the few cases where the court acknowledged it was 
dismissing a case on the pleadings based on hypothetical defenses.143  
However, in that case the Fourth Circuit contended that any defense 
would have to involve state secrets because state secrets were so central 
to the litigation and concerned its very subject matter.  This argument 
was expressly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Mohamed.144 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly permitted the dismissal of 
plaintiff‘s complaint in Mohamed because the possibility of merely 
hypothetical defenses is not appropriate under the Reynolds framework 
and no valid defense was ever advanced by the defendants. 
D. Dismissal at the Outset Is Against Policy Reasons and Is Contrary to 
Other Countries’ Interpretations of State Secrets Privileges. 
Since the emergence of the state secrets doctrine, first following the 
Aaron Burr case in 1807, and then formally in Totten v. U.S., a critical 
question has remained about how best to balance protecting the 
 
 141. Id. at 150–151. 
 142. Id. at 154. 
 143. Id. at 149 (citing El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 309 (4th Cir. 2007)) (noting that 
any valid defense that the defendants‘ might raise would involve privileged information and would, 
therefore, dismiss the need to consider particular defenses). 
 144. Id. 
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government‘s interest while providing litigants fair and open access to 
justice.  Courts began interpreting Reynolds to mean that secret 
information should be walled off from non-secret information and cases 
should ordinarily not be dismissed at the outset because, as a public 
policy matter, litigants deserve their day in court.145  Indeed, since 
Totten was decided 150 years ago there has only been one other concrete 
example of the U.S. Supreme Court dismissing a case at the outset based 
on its very subject matter—Tenet.146 
The reasons why outright dismissal of a suit without a discussion of 
its merits is disfavored by courts are clear.  These reasons were 
articulated by the majority in Mohamed: (1) that outright dismissal is 
rarely applied, and the parameters for it are not clearly defined; (2) that 
the state secrets doctrine is judge-made and has extremely harsh 
consequences; and (3) that conducting a more detailed analysis will tend 
to improve the accuracy, transparency and legitimacy of the 
proceedings.147 
Dismissing a suit at the pleadings is a drastic measure for the reasons 
stated above.  Dismissal was particularly drastic in Mohamed because of 
the ongoing constitutional issues raised by the extraordinary rendition 
program. 
When the D.C. district court was considering whether to dismiss a 
wiretapping case at the pleadings, one of the reasons the court rejected 
the government‘s argument was because of the pervasive constitutional 
claims present in that case.148  As that court stated, no case dismissed at 
the pleadings because of its subject matter has ever involved 
―widespread violations of individual constitutional rights.‖149  The types 
of cases that had been dismissed at the outset included highly technical 
subject matter and claims involving contract disputes over covert 
espionage.  However, as that court noted, the issues in that suit involved 
 
 145. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 146. See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981).  To 
reiterate an earlier discussion, some courts, like the Ninth Circuit, have held that Weinberger was a third 
example of a case decided under Totten.  That, however, is not necessarily true, and the Court‘s 
discussion of state secrets in that case was limited to dicta. 
 147. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 148. See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 149. Id. 
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such significant constitutional questions that, as a matter of public 
policy, attempts should be made for the case to proceed.150  
This way of thinking—to grant evidentiary privileges but not absolute 
immunity to the government—is precisely in line with how many other 
democratic nations view the state secrets privilege.151  Most countries 
now tend to conduct a balancing test to determine whether the state‘s 
interest is so pivotal that immunity should be granted, or whether the 
court can, in pursuit of justice and the public interest, allow the suit to 
proceed without the offending information.152 
In Spain, for example, plaintiffs who brought a claim after their 
family members were killed for suspected terrorism were allowed to 
proceed to trial despite the government‘s protest.  Using a balancing 
test, the Spanish court determined that the plaintiffs‘ interests were more 
important than government‘s right to its confidential papers.153  The 
court concluded, ―Constitutional guarantees of the right to obtain 
effective protection from judges, and certainty that the rule of law shall 
prevail, should take precedence over the state‘s security interests.‖154 
Israeli courts considering a similar case to Mohamed—one that 
concerned how the Israeli government was interrogating potential terror 
suspects—also reached the conclusion that the state secrets privilege 
was insufficient to deny the plaintiffs their day in court over their 
constitutional claims.155  The Israeli court reasoned that while protecting 
state secrets was critical, Israel should not be permitted to ―consign its 
fight against terrorism to the twilight shadows of the law.‖156 
These nations‘ practices have demonstrated that it is possible to 
 
 150. Id. at 993–994. 
 151. Nicole Hallett, Protecting National Security or Covering Up Malfeasance: The Modern State 
Secrets Privilege and Its Alternatives, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 82 (2007), 
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/10/01/hallett.html (summarizing how other countries view the state secrets 
privilege, and concluding that while the U.S. views the privilege as an absolute immunity to protect 
privileged information, most countries tend to balance the need to guard sensitive information with the 
importance of safeguarding constitutional rights). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (citing Constitucion C.E. art. 24, cl. 1 (Spain), translated in The Kingdom of Spain: 
Constitution, in XVII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1 (Rudiger Wolfrum & Rainer 
Grote eds., 2007)). 
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protect the government‘s secrets, carefully seal off protected documents, 
and still allow litigants to seek their day in court.  Ensuring that the 
government is responsible for its actions is precisely the way other 
courts in other nations have dealt with the state secrets privilege, and 
many Americans advocate this approach as well.  As previously noted, 
Congressional hearings, including legislation to end extraordinary 
rendition, have emerged in recent years.157  Earlier this year, a New York 
Times editorial on Mohamed stated, ―The state secrets privilege is so 
blinding and powerful that it should be invoked only when the most 
grave national security matters are at stake.  It should not be used to 
defend against allegations that if true, would be ‗gross violations of the 
norms of international law.‘‖158  This sound public policy is yet another 
reason why Mohamed was incorrectly decided and why the invocation 
of state secrets should not have led to dismissal at the pleadings in this 
case. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Throughout America‘s history, there has been tension between the 
conflicting goals of security and liberty.  The terrorist attacks on 
September 11 brought this tension to the forefront. As practices that 
once had been rare grew more common, the perceived need to shield 
those practices from scrutiny grew.  Extraordinary rendition is one such 
practice.  While it doubtlessly has contributed to the security of the 
United States, it is impossible to weigh whether those benefits outweigh 
the moral and human costs it has imposed on those who fall subject to it.  
Despite the government‘s official acknowledgment of extraordinary 
rendition, it is considered a state secret and prevents litigants from 
redressing wrongs in court.  The state secrets doctrine has existed for 
over 200 years, and it has an important role in securing our safety and 
ensuring that state secrets are not revealed.  The doctrine was created in 
recognition of the legitimate need to protect certain secret information; it 
was never intended to protect unconstitutional practices from judicial 
 
 157. Members of Congress, such as Rep. Ed Markey of Massachusetts and Sen. Patrick Leahy of 
Vermont, have in recent years introduced legislation that would prohibit the government‘s use of 
extraordinary rendition.  
 158. Editorial, Torture Is a Crime, Not a Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at A30. 
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scrutiny. 
While courts need to be conscientious about protecting state secrets, 
in only extreme circumstances should constitutional claims be barred in 
the name of national security.  The United States has held true to this 
ideal by preferring the Reynolds‘ flexible balancing test to Totten‘s total 
bar to litigation. 
It was under that general framework that the Ninth Circuit‘s three-
judge panel decided Mohamed v. Jeppesen and correctly concluded that 
the Reynolds test did not allow for complete dismissal of the suit at the 
pleadings stage.  The en banc reversal was an overbroad reading of 
Reynolds.  The decision was issued despite the fact that the defendants 
never filed an answer explaining their inability to respond and despite 
the fact that plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case without 
offending evidence.  By conflating Totten and Reynolds, and by granting 
dismissal so early in the litigation process, the Ninth Circuit turned an 
evidentiary privilege into an immunity doctrine. 
There is no doubt that some of the evidence either plaintiff or 
defendant would require in Mohamed was restricted due to the state 
secrets privilege.  However, the dissent‘s view—that the case should 
have been remanded to consider if the plaintiff‘s case could proceed—
was the better approach. 
While there are, to be sure, state secrets involved in extraordinary 
rendition cases, the existence and practice of extraordinary rendition is 
not a secret.  The Ninth‘s Circuit‘s Mohamed decision incorrectly 
applied the Reynolds test by allowing dismissal at the pleading stage 
without any showing that the case involved actual state secrets.  The 
Ninth Circuit did not fulfill its responsibility to engage in judicial 
scrutiny of allegedly unconstitutional acts by allowing the government 
to plea their way to immunity. 
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